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INTRODUCTION
Ever since the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984, Congress
has struggled to establish the appropriate balance of power between brand
name pharmaceutical companies and generic drug manufacturers. In an
effort to make generic drugs more affordable and accessible to the public,
* J.D., The University of Michigan Law School, 2011; Technology Editor, Michigan
Telecomrnmunications and Technology Law Review. Thank you to Professor Rebecca Eisen-
berg for her enthusiasm for student publication and her guidance in developing the topic and
to Stephen St.Vincent for his patience and endless support. Additional thanks to the MTTLR
editors of Volumes 17 and 18 of this Journal, especially Gautam Hans and Elizabeth Allen
for their support and Tracy Steindel for her feedback. An earlier version of this Note was
selected as the first place winner of the short papers category in the 2011 H. Thomas Austern
Memorial Writing Competition and was published in Volume 66-4 of the Food and Drug Law
Journal.
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the Hatch-Waxman Act changed patent infringement litigation at the point
of generic drug entry in the pharmaceutical marketplace.' This scheme rep-
resented the first time Congress directed the U.S. Food & Drug
Administration ("FDA") to consider patents for a brand name drug in timing
the approval of a generic version of that drug. The Hatch-Waxman frame-
work not only facilitates generic drug entry once valid patents expire but
also allows generic manufacturers to challenge drug patents before launch-
ing their own products, thereby providing some measure of risk
management.2 It also creates incentives for generic manufacturers to chal-
lenge these patents as early as possible with a 180-day period of market
exclusivity. 3 Through these incentives, Congress deliberately instituted a
system that would allow parties to adjudicate patent issues before generic
market entry.
Since 1984, both brand name and generic manufacturers have devised
innovative strategies to exploit the system, resulting in a number of
unintended consequences. Efforts have been made to capitalize on the
Congressionally-designed reward of 180 days of "generic exclusivity" for
the first entrant to challenge the patent(s) on a drug. In practice, generic
exclusivity has sometimes lasted far longer than the half-year Congress
contemplated because companies have found ways to delay the "trigger"
events that start the 180-day meter running. For example, if a first-filer
chose not to enter the market immediately,' and the patent holder did not
sue, then the approval of subsequent-filers' ANDAs could be delayed indef-
initely. Declaratory judgments could potentially solve this problem by
allowing a subsequent filer to unilaterally trigger the start of the generic ex-
clusivity period.
Congress responded by making a number of changes to the Hatch-
Waxman Act in 2003, including new provisions to facilitate declaratory
judgment actions by generic manufacturers seeking to challenge the validity
of drug patents.' By allowing a generic manufacturer to file a declaratory
judgment action before the potentially infringing product becomes commer-
cially available, the Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes courts to issue what
1. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-Waxman) Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, tit. 1, 98 Stat. 1585, amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act § 505 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355). See infra Background.
2. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) defers generic approval during the
term(s) of the patent(s) covering the brand name drug unless the sponsor of the generic
product challenges patent validity and infringement. Instead of waiting until the generic
manufacturer has started marketing its drug and becomes liable for damages, the statute
allows the brand name manufacturer or patent owner to sue for infringement when a generic
manufacturer submits an application to the FDA for approval that challenges those patents.
See infra Background.
3. See infra Background.
4. First-filers may voluntarily delay market entry as a result of manufacturing diffi-
culties or an agreement with the brand name manufacturer to delay entry.
5. See infra Background.
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appear to be advisory opinions. Meanwhile, following the Supreme Court's
decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,6 the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("Federal Circuit") broadened its view on the scope of
standing for generic manufacturers in declaratory judgment actions.7 These
recent reforms have allowed subsequent generic manufacturers to circum-
vent the first-filer's delays. At the same time, however, these reforms reduce
the Act's incentive for first-filers to bring prompt patent challenges by pro-
moting disputes over their priority.
This Note examines the changing role of declaratory judgment actions
in challenging patents upon generic entry and evaluates alternative regulato-
ry schemes to the FDA's current system of patent enforcement in the drug
approval setting. Part I reviews the Federal Circuit's recent decisions regard-
ing generic drug entry, focusing on how the courts justify declaratory
judgments in the current system and when a "controversy" exists to create
Article Il1 jurisdiction. Part II examines the complex system of regulating
generic drug entry and how attempts to stop the exploitation of loopholes
have resulted in a patchwork of regulation by various parties. It challenges
the current regulatory scheme with alternative regulatory mechanisms of
discretion by courts, litigation by subsequent-filers, legislative changes by
Congress, and antitrust policing by the FTC. Part III hypothesizes that a
likely increase in litigation will force courts to become more active in the
regulation of patent rights in relation to generic drug entry, especially in
light of the recently liberalized standing requirements, and draws attention
to the competing goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act that courts must remem-
ber to balance.
BACKGROUND
In a series of recent cases, the Federal Circuit has liberalized the availa-
bility of declaratory judgment actions involving generic drug entry. In order
to understand these cases, it is necessary to provide a bit of background on
the relevant statutory provisions. Congress first codified the current system
in the Hatch-Waxman Act (also known as the Drug Price Competition and
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984). This statute created the framework
for controlling the approval of generic drugs with a notification and certifi-
cation system that heavily relies on the "Approved Drug Products with
Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations," a publication commonly known as
6. Medlmmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
7. Before MedImmune, the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence on declaratory judgments
in pharmaceutical patent litigation at the point of generic drug entry stood out against the
backdrop of otherwise settled declaratory judgment decisions. After the 2003 amendments,
the court's strict requirements were also out of line with Congressional policy, so the Su-
preme Court made its stance clear in MedImmune that jurisdiction requirements should be
liberalized. These recent Federal Circuit cases may not have been necessary except to clear
up the Federal Circuit's previous anomalous jurisprudence. See infra Part I.
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the "Orange Book."8 When filing a New Drug Application ("NDA"), an
applicant must include every relevant patent that the applicant could reason-
ably assert to protect the innovator drug9 for which the applicant is seeking
approval.'o The NDA applicant must also file any subsequent, post-NDA
patents that issue." Once the NDA is approved, the FDA publishes the in-
novator drug as a "Reference Listed Drug" ("RLD") with a list of all
relevant patents in the Orange Book.12
When a generic manufacturer wishes to enter the market, it may submit
an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA"). Instead of conducting its
own time-consuming and expensive clinical studies, a generic manufacturer
filing an ANDA may rely on an RLD's safety and efficacy studies so long as
the applicant can show the generic drug to be "bioequivalent" to the RLD."
Often, the drug described in the ANDA may infringe the patents that cover
the RLD. The Hatch-Waxman Act addresses this by requiring the generic
manufacturer to file a "Paragraph IV certification," where the generic manu-
facturer guarantees that either: (1) the ANDA product does not infringe any
of the RLD's listed patents; or (2) the RLD's patents are invalid. 4 Paragraph
IV certifications drive ANDA litigation; once each owner of the patent and
the NDA holder have been notified of the Paragraph IV certification, each
has standing to sue the generic manufacturer for patent infringement based
8. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A) (2010); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., ELECTRONIC OR-
ANGE BOOK: APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS
(2011), http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cderlob/default.cfm [hereinafter ORANGE
BOOK]. The generic drug information in the Orange Book is updated daily to reflect new
approvals.
9. The "innovator" drug is usually a "brand name" drug.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). According to the FDA, the following patents must be filed:
patents that claim the active ingredient(s), including those claiming polymorphs, metabolites,
and intermediates; patents that claim the drug formulation or composition, including inter-
mediates or novel products of product-by-process patents; and patents claiming one or more
methods of use for which approval is being sought. If there are no relevant patents, the New
Drug Application (NDA) applicant must note that. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(c)-(d) (2011); see
also FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATENT INFORMATION SUBMITTED WITH THE FILING OF AN NDA,
AMENDMENT, OR SUPPLEMENT, FORM 3542A (2010), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM048352.pdf [hereinafter FDA FORM
35 4 2A]; ORANGE BOOK, supra note 8, at Preface.
I1. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(d)(3); FDA FORM 3542A.
12. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(e); ORANGE BOOK, supra note 8, at § 1.4.
13. Bioequivalence is a complicated term that is defined in section 505(j)(8) of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(8)(B). See also 21 C.F.R. § 320.24 for methods
used to define bioequivalence. A pioneer or innovator drug is also called the "Reference
Listed Drug" (RLD) for Orange Book purposes. ORANGE BOOK, supra note 8, at § 1.4. The
Hatch-Waxman Act refers to it as the "listed drug." See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i).
14. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). The "ANDA product" is the drug described in
the Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA). ANDAs can alternatively include a Para-
graph I certification "that such patent information has not been filed"; a Paragraph II
certification "that such patent has expired"; or a Paragraph III certification "of the date on
which such patent will expire." Id. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(1)-(lll).
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on the description of its ANDA product.'" If the patent owner or NDA hold-
er does not sue within forty-five days of receiving notice, the FDA can
approve the ANDA immediately.'" However, if the patent owner or NDA
holder does sue the generic manufacturer within forty-five days, the FDA
automatically stays approval of the ANDA for thirty months (the "30-month
stay")."
In 2003, Congress changed the playing field with Title XI, the "Access
to Affordable Pharmaceuticals" subtitle of the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 ("MMA").'5 These amend-
ments to the Hatch-Waxman Act affected the rights of manufacturers who
filed ANDAs containing Paragraph IV certifications after December 8,
2003." The MMA amendments created a cause of action permitting ANDA
filers to seek declaratory judgments if they provided notice and neither the
NDA holder nor patent owner sued for infringement within the statutory
forty-five day window. 20 This codified courts' subject matter jurisdiction
over declaratory judgments by ANDA filers "to the extent consistent with
the Constitution ."21
15. See id. § 355(j)(2)(B). The "NDA holder" is the brand name manufacturer who
"holds" an approved NDA for the RLD.
16. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006). The NDA holder can still assert its patents (includ-
ing any not listed in the Orange Book) and sue for patent infringement later, but it loses a
very significant portion of the market once the generic drug is launched.
17. Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). The FDA will not approve the ANDA until the patent ex-
pires, a court finds noninfringement or invalidity, or the end of the thirty-month stay,
whichever of the three is earliest. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Elan Pharm. Research Corp., 212
F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2000), in which the FDA granted a thirty-month stay when a generic
manufacturer filed a Paragraph IV certification of noninfringement, and the NDA holder
sued. The district court's decision of summary judgment of noninfringement was affirmed by
the Federal Circuit.
18. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1101-02, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)).
19. The FDA noted in its Guidance Document that the collusive agreement forfei-
ture provision (21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V)) would apply to all ANDAs filed after
December 2003 even if the first ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification was filed before
December 2003. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: LISTED DRUGS,
30-MONTH STAYS, AND APPROVAL OF ANDAS AND 505(B)(2) APPLICATIONS UNDER
HATCH-WAXMAN, AS AMENDED BY THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT,
AND MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003 12 (2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidances/ ucm072887.pdf.
20. See 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(C)(i)(I). If the patent owner and NDA holder do not sue
within these forty-five days, they do not relinquish their cause of action. They can still sue
the generic manufacturer for patent infringement when the generic drug product enters the
market.
21. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5); see also infra Part I. Congress enacted this legislation
prior to MedImmune, but the Supreme Court appears to have confirmed that the Constitution
should be less of a constraint than the Federal Circuit seemed to believe. Medlmmune, Inc.
v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126-36 (2007). In light of the MedImmune decision, these
amendments are much more likely to be upheld if challenged.
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The FDA grants a 180-day exclusivity period to the first generic manu-
facturer that files a Paragraph IV certification to a patent listed for an RLD,
the "first-filer." 22 A generic manufacturer that files or certifies later based on
the same NDA is dubbed a "subsequent-filer." The FDA delays final ap-
proval of a subsequent-filer's ANDA until the first-filer's exclusivity period
ends.23 The exclusivity period begins when the first-filer engages in its first
commercial marketing (the "commercial marketing trigger"). 24 For ANDAs
filed pre-MMA, a court judgment finding the patent invalid or not infringed
can also trigger the start of the generic exclusivity period (the "court judg-
ment trigger"). 25 The purpose of this exclusivity period is to incentivize
ANDA filers to challenge the validity of or to design around the listed pa-
tents as early as possible, 26 clearing the path for subsequent generic
manufacturers to enter the market.27
Another consideration in ANDA litigation comes from the tendency for
multiple patents to be listed in the Orange Book for a single RLD, with dif-
fering expiration dates for each patent. In ANDA litigation, these patents are
often distinguished as "earlier-expiring patents" ("EEPs") or "later-expiring
patents" ("LEPs"). This distinction is important because ANDA approval is
restricted by the term of any valid, listed patent. The NDA holder can
22. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)-(iv) (2006). This exclusivity period results in a
much larger market share for the first-filer. The generic exclusivity period does not extend
past the expiration of the relevant patent(s).
23. See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
24. See id. Triggering the generic exclusivity period by a first commercial marketing
was clarified in the MMA amendments to include marketing of authorized generics. An
"authorized generic" is a licensed version of the RLD. See 157 CONG. REC. S797 (daily ed.
Feb. 16, 2011) (introducing the Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act, S. 373, 112th Cong.
(1st Sess. 2011)). While the NDA holder can market or license the right to make an author-
ized generic, the FDA will not approve any ANDA, and so other generic manufacturers
cannot enter the market. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
25. The MMA amendments replaced the court judgment trigger with forfeiture provi-
sions to create situations in which the first-filer would lose its exclusivity period. See id.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)-(VI). These new provisions only apply to ANDAs with Paragraph IV
certifications filed after the effective date of the MMA, in December 2003. See id.
§ 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II). The court judgment trigger is no longer explicit in the exclusivity
period provision, but it is an important element in the cases following MedImmune. See id;
infra note 41.
26. A generic manufacturer cannot file an ANDA for a certain number of years after
an NDA is approved. See id. § 355(c)(3)(E).
27. The MMA amendments added six forfeiture provisions, including one that re-
scinds a first-filer's exclusivity period if it fails to go to market within seventy-five days or
enters into an agreement with the NDA holder that the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
finds anticompetitive. See id. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I), (V). This language was added in response
to reverse payment settlements, in which a brand manufacturer would make a deal with the
first-filer generic to delay market entry by "parking" its exclusivity period, thus delaying the
market entry of subsequent-filing generics as well. See 149 CONG. REC. 15,884 (2003). No-
tably, once a first-filer has forfeited its exclusivity period, the exclusivity period does not
"roll over" to a subsequent filer; the exclusivity is forfeited completely, instead of inherited
by the second-to-file generic manufacturer. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI)(iii)(ll).
choose to sue on only one of several patents-usually the EEP-to trigger
the 30-month stay. Different ANDA filers may challenge different patents;
thus, a subsequent-filer can challenge a patent that the first-filer did not
challenge. As a result, before the MMA amendments, multiple ANDA filers
could share the generic exclusivity period because there could be more than
one "first" Paragraph IV certification for an RLD.28 The setup of this com-
plex regulatory scheme in the multi-billion-dollar pharmaceutical industry
gave rise to the ANDA litigation that explores the courts' interpretation of
the relevant Hatch-Waxman provisions.
I. "CONTROVERSY" IN DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS
A. The MedImmune Change
The Supreme Court recently liberalized the jurisdictional requirements29
for potential defendants in patent infringement suits to bring declaratory
judgment actions, overturning a long line of Federal Circuit patent cases.30 In
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,31 the Supreme Court reversed a Federal
28. The MMA amendments attached the exclusivity period to the first-filer(s) for the
product, whereas previously it attached to the individual patent. This was directed to the
shared "patent-by-patent" exclusivity policies of the FDA that resulted in the confusion in
Teva v. Eisai about whether Ranbaxy, Teva, or both had exclusivity periods. See infra IC.
The exclusivity period could be triggered by any commercial marketing, and the FDA would
approve any eligible "first-filer" ANDAs during the exclusivity. See Letter from Gary Buehler,
Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to
Andrx Pharm., Inc. (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/
CentersOffices/CDER/ucml20609.htm; Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic
Drugs, Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Apotex Corp. (July 30,
2003), available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/CDER/ucml20608.htm.
Now shared exclusivity exists on a "first applicant" basis if the ANDA filers file "first" on the
same day. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2000); 149 CONG. REC. 15,884 (2003); Letter
from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Drug
Evaluation & Research, to Applicant (Sept. I1, 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/Appro
valApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationANDAGenerics/UCM I82134.pdf.
29. Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to "cases"
and "controversies," and the Declaratory Judgment Act created a prospective cause of action
limited to cases of "actual controversy." U.S. CoNsT. art. Ill, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a)
(2010).
30. The Federal Circuit had previously applied a narrow reading of this requirement in
order to limit standing, requiring that the declaratory judgment plaintiff have "reasonable
apprehension" of the patent holder bringing an infringement suit. See, e.g., Teva Pharm.
USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (rejecting Teva's argument
that it had reasonable apprehension of imminent suit simply because the NDA holder had
listed patents in the Orange Book); BP Chem. Ltd. v. Union Carbide Corp., 4 F.3d 975, 978
(Fed. Cir. 1993) ("There must be both (1) an explicit threat or other action by the patentee,
which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff that it will
face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity which could constitute infringement or
concrete steps taken with the intent to conduct such activity.").
31. Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 118-19 (2007).
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Circuit decision that the plaintiff in a declaratory judgment action lacked
standing. MedImmune had a licensing agreement with Genentech, who held
patents and patent applications that covered MedImmune's product. Both
the district court and Federal Circuit had dismissed MedImmune's declara-
tory judgment action, finding that MedImmune did not present a
"controversy" because a patent holder presumably had no reason to sue its
licensee.3 2 The Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit's "apprehension
of suit" test to determine standing conflicted with Supreme Court prece-
dent.33 The Court explained that a dispute satisfies the constitutional
requirement when "the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal in-
terests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a
declaratory judgment."34 The Supreme Court's holding overturned the Fed-
eral Circuit's restrictive approach for determining whether a party had
standing to file a declaratory judgment action against a patent holder. As a
result, the decision expanded the range of plaintiffs who could challenge a
patent's validity, enforceability, or scope. Though the MMA amendments
themselves were not at issue in MedImmune, the Court appeared to confirm
the constitutional authority of Congress to create the MMA's declaratory
judgment cause of action.
Yet, Medimmune may be distinguishable from normal ANDA litigation
because it did not examine infringement based on Paragraph IV certifica-
tions, but rather literal patent infringement outside of the drug approval
process. In MedImmune, Genentech licensed MedImmune to sell a drug
covered by, among other things, a pending patent application.35 When the
patent issued, Genentech sent a letter stating that the drug was covered by
the new patent.36 MedImmune then sought a declaratory judgment that
32. The Federal Circuit previously held that a patent licensee in good standing could
not establish Article III jurisdiction as to the validity, enforceability, or scope of the patent.
See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (finding that "unless
materially breached," a license agreement "obliterated any reasonable apprehension of a
lawsuit"). A patent holder would not have any reason to sue a licensee because the licensee
has been granted rights by the patent holder to make, use, or sell what is covered by the pa-
tent. However, if the licensee fails to pay royalties or otherwise follow the licensing
agreement, or infringes other patents not included in the license, then the patent holder could
sue. Id.
33. Congress also addressed the Federal Circuit's "reasonable apprehension" test
when discussing the MMA amendments. See 149 CONG. REC. 15, 752-55 (2003) (noting that
"to the extent consistent with the Constitution" language in 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) was meant
to allow courts to use a "reasonable apprehension" test so long as they found it within consti-
tutional bounds, but the test was more narrow than what is required by Article III or the
Declaratory Judgment Act, and the focus of the standing inquiry should be "whether the
would-be patent challenger has been reasonably and actually deterred from undertaking a
profitable enterprise").
34. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (quoting Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 121.
36. Id.
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Genentech's patent was invalid.17 Thus, the drug product in Medimmune
was already on the market, and the dispute stemmed from continued royalty
payments.38 in contrast, ANDA filers bring declaratory judgments prior to
market entry, which is only possible because Congress created an artificial
infringement cause of action when an ANDA is filed 39 As a result, cases
about generic drug entry address more hypothetical issues, and court deci-
sions in this arena seem much like advisory opinions. By explicitly adding a
cause of action to the MMA amendments, it seems clear that Congress
wanted courts to have jurisdiction over this matter. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court may be unwilling to relax jurisdictional requirements to this
degree.40
Furthermore, MedImmune did not address the potential deprivation of a
third party's rights. In ANDA litigation, actions brought by subsequent-filers
can affect a first-filer's exclusivity period. Nonetheless, the basic message in
MedImmune directed courts to reconsider standing in declaratory judgment
actions, and the Federal Circuit responded.
B. Federal Circuit Cases After MedImmune
In response to the MMA amendments and the Supreme Court's opinion
in MedImmune, the Federal Circuit in subsequent cases liberalized its rules
for allowing ANDA plaintiffs to challenge patents in declaratory judgment
actions.41 Instead of using the ANDA statutory provisions as a special rea-
son to deny standing, the Federal Circuit used the provisions as a special
reason to recognize it.42 The court explored the repercussions of declaratory
judgment actions in the Hatch-Waxman scheme in this recent series of cases
involving subsequent-filers, who were not the first generic manufacturers to
37. Id. at 121-22.
38. A licensee like Medimmune would have chosen to continue paying royalties be-
cause courts may issue treble damages if the infringement is found to be willful, which can
be shown by continued infringing actions after notice of the patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 284
(2000); see also Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007). In con-
trast, no commercial product is at issue in ANDA litigation since the litigation is prior to
market entry, so no money damages are at stake.
39. See 21 U.S.C. § 355()(5)(C)(i)(I) (2010); supra text accompanying note 20.
40. The Supreme Court still emphasized the impropriety of advisory opinions in
MedImmune by noting that a declaratory judgment that satisfies standing requirements could
be "distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts." Medimmune, 549 U.S. at 127-28.
41. See, e.g., Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co. Ltd., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010);
Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Janssen
Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc.
v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007). Although the MMA changes
technically did not apply in cases like these where the first ANDA with Paragraph IV certifi-
cations was filed before December 2003, the Supreme Court certainly mentioned the
legislation and discussed the changes to the system in MedImmune.
42. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
Fall 201l] Teva v. Eisai 277
Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review
challenge a patent on a given brand name drug.43 In all of these cases, the
first-filers included Paragraph IV certifications to all of the patents
listed-both EEPs and LEPs-for the RLDs. Upon receiving notice, the
NDA holders (the brand name manufacturers) sued the generic manufac-
turers for infringing the EEPs but did not assert any LEPs. This classic
NDA holder's strategy allowed them to assert a patent to trigger the 30-
month stay, while still protecting the other patents from potentially being
invalidated. Through Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Forest
Laboratories, Inc., Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., and Teva
Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Eisai Company Ltd, the Federal Circuit elabo-
rated on the range of circumstances under which it would grant standing for
subsequent-filers to challenge the patents that provide generic exclusivity.
While both first-filers and subsequent-filers stand to benefit from judi-
cial determinations of patent invalidity that allow them to obtain final
approval of their ANDAs, thus expediting their entry into the pharmaceu-
tical marketplace, only first-filers have the added incentive of securing
180-day generic exclusivity.44 For subsequent-filers, the generic exclusivi-
ty period is an additional barrier that delays final approval of ANDAs by
the FDA. In practice, the entry barrier may last far longer than 180 days if
competitors are able to delay the events which trigger the exclusivity pe-
riod. Therefore, subsequent-filers stand to benefit from an early start to
the exclusivity period, as they can enter the market sooner. Before the 2003
amendments, if the first-filer (1) chose not to enter the market immediately
upon approval of its ANDA, whether from manufacturing difficulties or be-
cause of an agreement with the NDA holder; and (2) was not sued by the
patent holder, the subsequent-filers would be held in limbo indefinitely.4 5
With neither of the two trigger events to start the 180-day period, the period
would never come to an end, and subsequent-filers could never get their
products approved. If, however, a subsequent-filer could bring its own de-
claratory judgment action, a favorable court judgment would trigger the start
of the first-filer's exclusivity period.
This potential delay of exclusivity formed the context of this series of
recent Federal Circuit cases. In several different situations, the court consid-
ered whether a subsequent-filer had standing to sue an NDA holder for
listing a patent in the Orange Book. Shortly after the MedImmune decision,
the Federal Circuit issued an opinion in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v.
Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.4 6 Teva, the first generic manufacturer to file
Paragraph IV certifications to all five patents listed in the Orange Book for
43. Eisai, 620 F.3d 1341; Caraco, 527 F.3d 1278; Janssen Pharmaceutica, 540 F.3d
1353; Novartis, 482 F.3d 1330.
44. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2010).
45. See supra text accompanying notes 24-25 (referring to the "commercial marketing
trigger" and the "court judgment trigger").
46. Novartis, 482 F.3d at 1330.
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the RLD, sought a declaratory judgment against the remaining four patents,
after the NDA holder, Novartis, only asserted the EEP.47 The Federal Circuit
reversed the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment and re-
jected the "reasonable apprehension of imminent suit" test that it had
followed for years.4 Instead, the Novartis court adopted MedImmune's "all
the circumstances" standard for determining whether a justiciable contro-
versy for declaratory judgment actions exists. The court concluded that
when an NDA holder chooses not to assert all its patents in an infringement
suit at generic entry, the ANDA filer is still under the "threat of litigation"
and subject to "legal uncertainty," because the NDA holder can choose to
sue on the other patents at any time.49 Accordingly, by listing its patents in
the Orange Book and filing suit based on the Paragraph IV certification, the
NDA holder directly caused an injury to Teva, the ANDA applicant.50
Therefore, the court found that a justiciable controversy existed for all of
the listed patents to which the ANDA filer had made a Paragraph IV certifi-
cation, not just those on which the NDA holder had elected to sue.' While
the case was brought by a first-filer seeking a declaratory judgment action, 52
Novartis exemplifies the start of the Federal Circuit's liberalization of de-
claratory judgment actions in the generic drug entry context.
The Federal Circuit revisited the issue in Caraco Pharmaceutical La-
boratories, Ltd. v. Forest Laboratories, Inc.13 Caraco focused on a
subsequent-filer's ability to bring a declaratory judgment action against an
NDA holder.5 4 The NDA holder, Forest Labs, listed two patents for the
47. Novartis could put Teva in a difficult position. Even if Teva prevailed in the in-
fringement suit or waited until the earlier-expiring patent (EEP) expired, entering the market
would put Teva at risk of patent infringement liability because the later-expiring patents
(LEPs) could still be enforced. The district court, applying the Federal Circuit's former
"apprehension of suit" test, dismissed Teva's declaratory judgment action for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. at 1339-40.
48. Id. at 1339, 1346. Instead of analyzing jurisdiction as whether Teva had "reasona-
ble apprehension" of being sued by Novartis, the court stated that "[a]n Article III
controversy is found where a plaintiff has demonstrated an injury-in-fact caused by the de-
fendant that can be redressed by the court." Id. at 1340 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83 (1998)). Using language from declaratory judgment cases outside
the ANDA litigation context highlighted the changes in how the court discussed standing
and justified those changes.
49. Id. at 1345; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)(1).
50. Novartis, 483 F.3d at 1345.
51. Id. at 1344.
52. Because Teva was a first-filer, its concern was "at-risk launch" rather than delay
from generic exclusivity. Launching "at risk" means the generic manufacturer knows it may
be liable for patent infringement but chooses to enter the market anyway. If a generic manu-
facturer loses the infringement suit, a court may award treble damages for willful
infringement. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 121-22 (2007).
53. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
54. The ANDA in question was submitted by Caraco, a generic manufacturer, and
contained Paragraph IV certifications to two patents, an EEP and a LEP. Another generic
manufacturer, Ivax, had filed Paragraph IV certifications to the patents first, and thus had the
generic exclusivity period. Forest, the NDA holder, had sued Ivax for infringing the EEP and
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RLD.11 Forest sued the subsequent-filer, Caraco, solely for infringement of
the EEP.5 6 After the decision in Novartis was issued, Forest unilaterally
granted Caraco an irrevocable covenant not to sue for infringement of the
LEP.57 Nonetheless, Caraco brought a declaratory judgment action against
Forest for noninfringement of the LEP because it was prevented from mar-
keting the drug based on a previous generic filer's ANDA application."
The district judge dismissed the action for lack of Article III jurisdic-
tion, finding that there was "no threat of lawsuit" because of the covenant
not to sue.59 The Federal Circuit reversed and held that preventing Caraco
from going to market with a noninfringing drug created a justiciable contro-
versy.60 Caraco's injury-in-fact was a "restraint on the free exploitation of
non-infringing goods" 61-that is, the improperly delayed approval of its
ANDA and the resulting deprivation of an economic opportunity to com-
pete. 62 The Caraco panel found that, under all the circumstances, neither the
Hatch-Waxman Act nor the FDA framework alone was responsible for Car-
aco's injury; the improper use of the system created standing.63 The LEP as
won, surviving a challenge to the patent's validity and obtaining a court finding of infringe-
ment by Ivax's ANDA product. As a result, Ivax could not obtain approval to enter the
market and begin its exclusivity period (via the commercial marketing trigger) until the EEP
expired or was found invalid by another court judgment. However, a subsequent-filer like
Caraco could challenge both the EEP and LEP and use the court judgment trigger to start the
first-filer's exclusivity period. See id. at 1286, 1296.
55. Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1286.
56. Id. at 1288.
57. Id. at 1289.
58. Id. at 1288.
59. Id. at 1289-90.
60. Id. at 1291. The court found that following Novartis, the Article Ill controversy
still existed "in the context of the Hatch-Waxman framework." Id. at 1292. The FDA cannot
grant final approval to another ANDA until the first-filer's exclusivity has run, even if the
subsequent-filer's ANDA product would not infringe the patents. Id. Therefore, the subse-
quent-filer would need a way to trigger the exclusivity period without "apprehension" of
being sued for infringement. Id. Thus, "proving a reasonable apprehension of suit is only one
of many ways a patentee can satisfy the Supreme Court's more general all-the-circumstances
test to establish that an action presents a justiciable Article III controversy." Id. at 1291.
61. Id. at 1291 (citing Red Wing Shoe Co. v. Hockerson-Halberstadt, Inc., 148 F.3d
1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).
62. Id. at 1291-92. The Hatch-Waxman scheme created this artificial infringement
where a commercial product has not yet been released so there is no possibility of damages.
Id. at 1283. In this special context, the court found that the injury should be a lack of oppor-
tunity to compete in the marketplace and should be traceable to the NDA holder. Id. at 1292.
63. Because Forest listed the LEP in the Orange Book, a generic manufacturer could
file a Paragraph IV certification and obtain an exclusivity period. This would delay the final
approval of any subsequent ANDAs (including Caraco's) for the same RLD. Without NDA
holders listing patents as valid and covering the RLD, the statute "would not independently
delay Caraco's ANDA from being approved by the FDA." Id. at 1292. Even if Forest's action
"could only exclude Caraco from the drug market in the context of the Hatch-Waxman
framework," Caraco's injury was no less "concrete, actual, or imminent." Id. (citing Steel
Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1998)). When a first-filer's exclusiv-
ity based on a properly listed patent is the source of delay, no injury should be found because
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listed in the Orange Book created "an independent barrier to the drug mar-
ket," so Caraco's injury was "fairly traceable" to Forest.6 The injury was
redressable because a favorable declaratory judgment for Caraco (i.e., that
the LEP was not infringed) would "clear the path to FDA approval that For-
est's actions would otherwise deny Caraco" 65 by triggering the first-filer's
exclusivity period.66 The court further held that the covenant not to sue did
not make the action moot because the listing of the LEP and the resulting
FDA enforcement of the generic exclusivity period, not the threat of suit,
delayed Caraco's market entry. A covenant not to sue "does not affect the
FDA's authority to approve the ANDA" in the Hatch-Waxman framework. 67
As such, the only way to resolve the controversy would be to determine
whether the drug in Caraco's ANDA infringed the LEP.
By going through the standard factors for standing and applying them
specifically in an ANDA case, the Federal Circuit appeared to be rationaliz-
ing the switch to allow standing in declaratory judgment actions. The
Caraco panel found that allowing a subsequent-filer to initiate a declaratory
judgment in these circumstances was "consistent with the basic purpose of
the Declaratory Judgment Act."68 The court did not want to permit "a re-
stricted patent to justify much wider claims of infringement"69 through the
FDA's enforcement of the Hatch-Waxman procedure without subjecting the
patent to a "court determination of its scope.""o The court also found that a
declaratory judgment action would be consistent with the "basic goal of the
that delay comes from the intended operation of the Hatch-Waxman Act. When an NDA
holder lists patents improperly, the unintended downstream effect delays subsequent generic
entry, so ajusticiable injury (and standing) exists.
64. Id. at 1293.
65. Id. See supra Background for the forfeiture provisions added by the MMA.
66. Caraco would still have to obtain a finding of invalidity or noninfringement on the
EEP, which was already subject to ongoing litigation. However, without standing for a de-
claratory judgment action, even if Caraco prevailed in the EEP litigation, it would not obtain
final FDA approval and enter the market until the first-filer's generic exclusivity period, cre-
ated by the LEP, had run. The court found that the action was ripe because dismissing
Caraco's action would have "the 'immediate and substantial impact' of forestalling Caraco's
ability to activate [the first-fileri's exclusivity period through the court-judgment trigger."
Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1295 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(l1) (2000)). "Whether an
action is 'ripe' requires an evaluation of 'both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision
and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.' " Id. at 1294-95 (citing
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967)). The court reasoned that "additional
factual development would not advance the district court's ability to decide" the declaratory
judgment action since the submitted ANDA would provide the information necessary to
determine noninfringement. Id. at 1295.
67. Id. at 1296.
68. Id. at 1293.
69. Id. at 1293-94 (citing EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDG-
MENTS 803-04 (2d ed. 1941)).
70. Id. at 1294. The majority also noted in a previous footnote that if Forest had
agreed to a consent decree finding non-infringement of the LEP, the "controversy" would
apparently have been resolved. id. at 1293 n.11.
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Hatch-Waxman Act, which is to balance the need for pharmaceutical inno-
vation with the need for generic drug competition."'
The opinion in Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V v. Apotex, Inc. ,72 delineates
the other end of the standing spectrum. The Federal Circuit panel found that
the district court correctly dismissed a subsequent-filer's declaratory judgment
counterclaims against the NDA holder for lack of Article 111 jurisdiction where
the subsequent-filer had stipulated to the validity of the patent at issue. As in
Caraco, the NDA holder, Janssen, asserted only the EEP against a subse-
quent-filer, Apotex, and granted a covenant not to sue on the LEPs. However,
unlike the declaratory judgment plaintiff in Caraco, Apotex stipulated to the
validity of the EEP listed for the RLD.n1 The district court held that Apotex
created its own block to approval, so the "controversy" no longer existed be-
tween the subsequent-filer and the NDA holder.
On appeal, Apotex presented several different injuries on which to base
its "controversy," including the inability to promptly launch upon expiration
of the EEP and infinite delay of approval for its noninfringing product.74 For
the "prompt launch" injury, Apotex argued that it currently would not be
able to enter the market until 181 days after the EEP expired because of the
first-filer's generic exclusivity period." However, the Janssen court found
that "the harm that created a justiciable Article III controversy in Caraco"
was the subsequent-filer's delayed market entry by a noninfringed patent,
which "ceased to exist" in this case because of Apotex's stipulation to in-
fringement.76 The harm that continued to exist-Apotex's "inability to
71. Id. at 1294 (citing Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed.
Cir. 2002)).
72. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008). The
first to file an ANDA containing a Paragraph IV certification was Teva, but Teva filed Para-
graph IV certifications only to the LEPs and a Paragraph III certification to the EEP. As in
Caraco, the first Paragraph IV ANDA was filed before the 2003 MMA amendments, so the
forfeiture provisions did not apply. Janssen did not sue Teva for infringement of either LEP,
so Teva not only obtained first-filer 180-day exclusivity, but was also able to start marketing
as soon as the EEP expired.
73. Id. at 1358.
74. Id. at 1359 ("Specifically, Apotex argues that (1) it is unable to promptly launch its
generic risperidone product and compete in the market immediately upon the expiration of
the '663 patent; (2) its approval of its noninfringing generic risperidone product is being
indefinitely delayed; and (3) its affiliates, suppliers, and downstream customers face patent
uncertainty because Janssen's covenant-not-to-sue does not cover them."). As for the "infi-
nite delay" argument, the court found that there needed to be "a basis to conclude" that the
first-filer would, or was likely to, delay in entering the market; without this, the alleged harm
was "too speculative." Id. at 1363 (citing Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1296 n.14). The court also
noted that Apotex would have to show this possibility of infinite delay between "the filing of
the counterclaims" and "the final judgment," not during oral arguments on appeal. The panel
held that "a possible delay in the future of a first Paragraph IV ANDA filer in launching its
generic product does not give rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction." Id. at 1363.
75. Id. at 1359-60. Since the first-filer's exclusivity period is based on its Paragraph
IV certifications to the LEPs, a court's judgment of noninfringement or invalidity of only the
LEPs would suffice to trigger the start of the generic exclusivity period.
76. Id. at 1360.
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launch immediately upon the expiration of the [EEP]"-was "not sufficient
to give rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction."77 Here, the first-filer, Teva,
could not trigger its exclusivity period with the "commercial marketing trig-
ger"78 until the EEP expired because it filed a Paragraph III certification,
which certifies that the patent is valid and the generic cannot obtain FDA
approval and enter the market until that patent expires. Therefore, Teva's
"statutorily entitled" exclusivity was the actual cause of Apotex's "inability
to promptly launch," which was a result "envisioned by the Hatch-Waxman
Act."79 Apotex sought to trigger the exclusivity period immediately, instead
of waiting for the commercial marketing trigger, so Teva would effectively
lose its generic exclusivity. The Janssen court distinguished Caraco, be-
cause the Caraco subsequent-filer sought to trigger the first-filer's
exclusivity period "at a time when [the first-filer] could obtain FDA approv-
al and then launch its product;" i.e., if Caraco obtained a favorable
judgment, the first-filer could start its exclusivity by marketing sooner, and
Caraco would get its approval sooner.80 This was not the case in Janssen
because Apotex was not able to obtain approval and launch until the EEP
expired due to its stipulation.
Furthermore, in a non-precedential opinion,8' the Federal Circuit recog-
nized that once a first-filer's exclusivity period has been triggered, any
potential controversy is rendered moot. The only remaining delay would be
"the balance of the [first-filer]'s 180-day exclusivity period," which is part
of the Hatch-Waxman framework. 82 The court also noted that while a judg-
ment "may have triggered [the first-filer]'s 180-day exclusivity period,
nothing in the statute provides that such a judgment can eliminate [the first-
filer]'s exclusivity period."8
C. The Controversy Over Aricept
On October 6, 2010, the Federal Circuit further clarified its views
on declaratory judgments in ANDA litigation with its opinion in Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co. 84 The case revolved around
77. Id.
78. See supra text accompanying note 24.
79. Id. at 1361. The court stressed the importance of the exclusivity period and the
Hatch-Waxman balance in finding that Apotex's injury did not present a justiciable "contro-
versy." Id. (citing C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as
a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1553, 1605 (2006)); Purepac Pharm. Co.
v. TorPharm, Inc., 354 F.3d 877, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). By the generic exclusivity provision,
Congress intended for some situations when otherwise permissible generic entry would be
delayed. See 21 U.S.C. 355(j)(5)(b)(iv) (providing an "exclusivity" period in which the FDA
will not grant final approval to other ANDAs).
80. Janssen, 540 F.3d at 1361 (emphasis removed).
81. Merck & Co. v. Apotex, No. 2007-1362 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2008).
82. Id. at 7.
83. Id.
84. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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Aricept," a drug mainly used to treat Alzheimer's disease. Aricept generates
global sales of approximately three billion dollars a year, with about two
billion dollars per year from U.S. sales.86 A generic version is expected to
take in $200 million or more in its first six months on the market,87 and
Aricept's U.S.-based revenue is expected to drop by sixty percent.8 It is no
exaggeration to say that millions of dollars were at stake in this case.
In 1996, Eisai received FDA approval for Aricept, manufactured as tab-
lets with the active ingredient of donepezil hydrochloride.89 Eisai listed five
patents-one EEP and four LEPs-in the Orange Book.90 Ranbaxy filed an
ANDA with a Paragraph III certification to the EEP and Paragraph IV certi-
fications to the LEPs. 91 Ranbaxy was the first to file Paragraph IV
certifications to the LEPs, so it obtained a generic exclusivity period based
on the LEPs. 92 Eisai did not sue Ranbaxy, so the FDA granted tentative ap-
proval to Ranbaxy's ANDA, to become final approval at the expiration of
the EEP.93
Teva filed an ANDA with Paragraph IV certifications to all of the pa-
tents. 94 As a result, Teva was a subsequent-filer to the LEPs, but a first-filer
to the EEP.95 Teva filed a second ANDA for donepezil in a different form
85. Aricept is a registered trademark of Eisai Company.
86. Press Release, Ranbaxy Laboratories, Ltd., Ranbaxy Launches Donepezil 5 MG
and 10 MG Tablets to U.S. Healthcare System (Nov. 30, 2010), available at http://www.
ranbaxyusa.com/newsdisp30121 0.aspx. Aricept represents about forty percent of the overall
revenue of Japan's fourth-largest drug company, the Eisai Company. EISAI Co., LTD., AN-
NUAL REPORT 43-69 (2011), available at http://www.eisai.com/pdf/eannual/epdf20l lan.pdf.
In comparison, Lipitor alone brought in $10.7 billion in 2010 and $11.4 billion in 2009.
PFIZER INC., 2010 FINANCIAL REPORT 25 (2011), available at http://www.pfizer.com/files/
annualreport/2010/financial/financial2010.pdf. To put all these numbers in perspective, Total
Unaudited and Audited Global Pharmaceutical Market 2003-2010, IMS HEALTH, available at
http://www.imshealth.com/deployedfiles/imshealtlGlobal/Content/StaticFileTopLine-Data/
TotalMarket 2003-2010 (last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
87. Ranbaxy to Launch Lw-Cost Alzheimer Drug in US Soon, THE EcON. TIMES OF
INDIA (Nov. 28, 2010), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/features/sunday-et/dateline-india/
Ranbaxy-to-launch-low-cost-Alzheimer-drug-in-US-soon/articleshowfl003214.cms. Generics
make up 75% of dispensed prescriptions in the U.S. Jonathan D. Rockoff, Prescription-Drug
Sales Rise 5.1%, WALL ST. J., Apr. 2,2010, at B4.
88. Eisai says Aricept's U.S. Sales to More than Halve, REUTERS (Mar. 4, 2010),
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTOE62306Z20100304.
89. Orange Book Detail Record Search for Aricept, FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cderlob/docs/obdetail.cfm?ApplNo-020690&TABLE
l=OBRx (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
90. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
91. Id. at 1344.
92. Id.
93. Orange Book Detail Record Search for Donepezil Hydrochloride, FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scipts/cder/ob/docs/obdetail.cfmAppl_No= 076786
& TABLEI=OB Rx (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
94. Eisai, 620 F.3d at 1344.
95. The FDA potentially could have awarded Teva a shared exclusivity period under
the FDA's previous patent-based approach, but the FDA later found that shared exclusivity
did not apply in this case, so Ranbaxy had the only generic exclusivity period. See Letter
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with Paragraph IV certifications to all patents, but the FDA requested the
application be filed through a subsidiary, Gate Pharmaceuticals." Under the
Gate ANDA, the actual ANDA underlying the dispute in Eisai, Teva is a
subsequent-filer with respect to both the EEP and LEPs.
In the same vein as Novartis, Caraco, and Janssen, the Eisai court ad-
dressed the issue of whether a district court had Article III jurisdiction over
a declaratory judgment action brought by a subsequent ANDA filer against
the NDA holder. The court found jurisdiction where the injury was an ina-
bility to enter the market due to a first-filer's generic exclusivity period
created by improperly listed patents.
The NDA holder, Eisai, sued the subsequent-filer, Teva, for infringe-
ment of the EEP and triggered the statutory 30-month stay. In return, Teva
sought a declaratory judgment that its ANDA product did not infringe the
LEPs.97 Eisai filed statutory disclaimers for two of the LEPs and offered
Teva a covenant not to sue on the remaining two. 8 The district court found
that it did not have jurisdiction for lack of controversy, and, even if it did
have jurisdiction, would decline to exercise it.99 The Federal Circuit re-
versed and held that a subsequent-filer has a "legally cognizable interest in
when the first-filer's exclusivity period begins." Therefore, when an NDA
holder lists its patents in the Orange Book, it causes an injury-in-fact suffi-
cient to create "controversy" for Article III jurisdiction.1" Eisai would not
be able to assert any of the LEPs against Teva because of the disclaimers
and covenant, but the Federal Circuit decided that generic drug entry would
still be improperly delayed. Because an ANDA filer must include certifica-
tions to all patents listed for the RLD, the fact that those unenforceable
patents remained listed in the Orange Book would provide generic exclusiv-
ity periods for first-filers and defer FDA approval of any subsequently-filed
ANDAs. 01
Teva presented an "infinite delay" argument, claiming that its injury
was traceable to Eisai because Eisai listed the LEPs in the Orange Book,
which provided the first-filer, Ranbaxy, with a generic exclusivity period.'02
from Keith Webber, Deputy Dir., Office of Pharm. Sci., to Ranbaxy Inc. (Nov. 26, 2010),
available at
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda-docs/appletter/2010/076786s0001tr.pdf (finding
Ranbaxy held the sole 180-day exclusivity period).
96. Eisai, 620 F.3d at 1344.
97. Id. at 1343.
98. See 35 U.S.C. § 253 (2007); 37 C.F.R. § 1.321 (1997). By statute, a patent owner
may disclaim patent claims in order to avoid invalidation of an entire patent, or a patent
owner may disclaim the remainder of the patent term. A covenant not to sue is an agreement
not to bring suit against that party for patent infringement. It is unclear why Eisai treated the
patents differently, but essentially Eisai could not assert any of the LEPs against Teva.
99. Eisai, 620 F.3d at 1344.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1345.
102. Id. at 1343. This exclusivity period was deferring final approval of Teva's ANDA, and
Ranbaxy was likely to delay entry into the market because of its regulatory troubles. The FDA
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Like the first-filer in Janssen, Ranbaxy could not enter the market until the
expiration of the EEP because of its Paragraph III certification."o3 Therefore,
its exclusivity could not be triggered any earlier than the expiration of the
EEP unless a court ruled that the LEPs were invalid or not infringed.'1
Teva, like the subsequent-filer in Janssen, was seeking to trigger the first-
filer's exclusivity period before the first-filer could even begin marketing its
product. The Eisai court found the critical distinction to be that the subse-
quent-filer in Janssen had stipulated to the validity, infringement, and
enforceability of the EEP. Therefore, the EEP in Janssen was no longer a
disputed factor deferring generic entry, and the earliest the FDA could
approve any ANDA would be upon expiration of the EEP. In contrast, the
first-filer in Caraco had filed a Paragraph IV certification to the EEP and
lost the litigation challenging the EEP, but the first-filer would have been
able to market its drug if the EEP was declared invalid in another suit. 05 In
both Caraco and Eisai, the EEP was the subject of pending litigation be-
tween the NDA holder and the subsequent-filer. If a court found the EEP to
be invalid, not infringed, or unenforceable, then the exclusivity period of the
first-filer could potentially be triggered and begin to run before the expira-
tion of the EEP.
In response to the comparison with Caraco and Janssen, Eisai argued
that the preliminary injunction in the pending EEP litigation meant that Teva
could not enter the market until the EEP expired. Even though Teva stipu-
lated to infringement of the EEP and agreed that the injunction would be
enforced until the expiration of the EEP, the court found that the preliminary
sent warning letters about problems with manufacturing practices at certain facilities in India
and issued an Import Alert for drugs from those facilities. See Press Release, Food & Drug Ad-
min., FDA Issues Warning Letters to Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd., and an Import Alert for Drugs
from Two Ranbaxy Plants in India (Sept. 16, 2008), available at http://www.fda.gov/
NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2008/ucml 16949.htm. Apotex argued that the
warnings indicated that the FDA would not grant final approval to Ranbaxy upon expiration of
the EEP A few months later, the FDA also suspended review of applications containing data
from a specific facility, based on findings of falsified data and test results for approved and pend-
ing drug applications. See Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Takes New Regulatory
Action Against Ranbaxy's Paonta Sahib Plant in India (Feb. 25, 2009), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucml49532.htm. However,
Ranbaxy was able to circumvent these issues by manufacturing drugs at other facilities. Mohit
Bhalla & Khomba Singh, Daiichi to Leverage Ranbaxy Abroad, THE EcON. TIMES OF INDIA
(Nov. 11, 2009), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/articleshow/5217703.cms (discussing
switching drug production to other facilities).
103. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
104. See Eisai, 620 F.3d at 1348 n.4. Ranbaxy filed its ANDA before the MMA
amendments became effective in December, so it could only start its exclusivity period via
commercial marketing or court judgment triggers. Id. at 1344 & n.2.
105. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1287 (Fed. Cir.
2008). In Caraco, the first-filer (who had exclusivity based on an unasserted LEP) had lost
the EEP litigation and was barred by a court decision from marketing until the EEP expired,
so if a court judgment declared the EEP invalid, the first-filer could obtain approval and
enter the market. Id.
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injunction issued by the district court did not factor into whether Teva's in-
jury was imminent, because jurisdiction is determined at the outset of the
appeal. 06 In a world post-eBay v. MercExchange, injunctions are much
more difficult to obtain in patent cases than they previously were. 0 7 Howev-
er, the Eisai court chose to disregard the district court's findings as merely
"preliminary" and not a "final determination" on the patent.0 s As a result,
the court could justify its decision that a controversy existed and found im-
minent harm for the purposes of standing.
D. Additional District Court Analyses
Two pre-Eisai district court decisions allowing declaratory judgment
actions to proceed present additional considerations for declaratory judg-
ments brought by subsequent-filers. Like the Federal Circuit cases, the NDA
holder in both of these cases did not assert all of its listed patents when
suing the subsequent-filer for infringement.'0 9 As a result, these subsequent-
filers also had potential injuries the courts could address.
In Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor Inc.,"o the district court focused on whether the
subsequent-filer would be able to enter the market before the first-filer
106. Eisai, 620 F. 3d at 1348 n.4. The Janssen court recognized that "[j]urisdiction
over a declaratory judgment action must be present 'at all stages of review, not merely at the
time the complaint is filed.'" Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 n.10 (1974)). The
court also found that "inability to launch its generic product immediately upon the expiration
of [an EEPI is not sufficient to give rise to declaratory judgment jurisdiction." Id.
107. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006). In eBay, the Supreme
Court criticized the Federal Circuit's practice of routinely granting injunctions in patent
infringement cases and held that courts had to analyze the traditional equitable factors even
in these types of cases. Id. at 392.
108. Eisai, 620 F.3d at 1348. One of the traditional factors in evaluating preliminary
injunctions is reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, so the district court already
found that Eisai was likely to succeed in its patent infringement suit as Teva stipulated to
infringement. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., No. 08-2344, slip. op. at 4 (D.N.J. Sept. 9,
2009). Teva would likely be unable to enter the market until the LEPs expired, so challeng-
ing the EEP would in fact be pointless.
109. Unlike the Federal Circuit cases Caraco, Janssen, and Eisai, however, the first-
filer in these cases had settled with the NDA holder and agreed to delay its entry into the
market, with the result of deferring other generic drug entry.
110. Dey, L.P. v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Del. 2009). The NDA holder
listed six patents in the Orange Book and sued the subsequent-filer for infringement of five
patents, leaving one unasserted. Id. at 358. The subsequent-filer sought a declaratory judg-
ment that its ANDA product would not infringe the unasserted LEP, even though the NDA
holder had offered a covenant not to sue for the LEP. Id. By holding the LEP in reserve and
not asserting it, the NDA holder was not risking a court finding of invalidity. Id. at 357-59.
If the subsequent-filer succeeded in the patent litigation and invalidated the asserted EEPs, it
would still be unable to enter the market until the LEP expired and the first-filer's exclusivi-
ty period had run. Id. at 360-61 (discussing Janssen).
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could,III rather than examining whether the subsequent-filer had an "infinite
delay" issue."12 The court found that a declaratory judgment action might
allow the subsequent-filer to trigger the first-filer's exclusivity period before
the first-filer could go to market. Doctrinally, this case addresses issues
somewhere in between Caraco and Janssen."3 The district court distin-
guished Janssen because the subsequent-filer in this case had not "precluded
itself from going to market prior to the [first-filer]" or otherwise stipulated
"to be on equal footing" with the first-filer."4 Therefore, the case presented
a justiciable controversy.
In Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc.,"' the district court found that the subse-
quent-filer could counterclaim for a declaratory judgment even if it had filed
a Paragraph III certification. Therefore, even if successful in challenging the
other patents, the subsequent-filer could not begin obtaining FDA approval
and enter the market immediately. In Pfizer, the subsequent-filer had filed a
Paragraph III certification to the EEP, so the alleged harm-the dilatory ef-
fects of an agreement between the NDA holder and first-filer '6-would not
take place until the EEP expired. Despite this, the district court found that
because the agreement between the first-filer and NDA holder was in place
when the subsequent-filer filed its counterclaims," there was likely an im-
minent injury-in-fact and the case was ripe.
111. Id. The NDA holder and first-filer had entered into a settlement agreement in
which the generic manufacturer could enter the market with a royalty-bearing license before
three of the six listed patents expired. Id. at 359, 361.
112. The first ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification in this case was filed after the
effective date of the MMA amendments, so the forfeiture provisions would apply and there
would be no "infinite delay" issue. Id. at 357-58.
113. Id. at 361. If the subsequent-filer could challenge the LEP, and successfully chal-
lenged all of the EEPs, the first-filer's exclusivity period would be triggered and start
running immediately. Id. at 361-62. The first-filer, bound by its settlement agreement, would
not be able to start marketing until the agreed-upon time in 2012, by which time the 180-day
period would have already run. Id. at 362. The first-filer would thus lose its generic exclusiv-
ity. Id.
114. Id. at 362. In Janssen, the first-filer had filed a Paragraph III certification to the
EEP. The subsequent-filer stipulated to infringement of the EEP, so it could not obtain FDA
approval until the EEP expired (or was found invalid)-the same practical effect as a Para-
graph III certification. Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353, 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
115. Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The NDA holder
had six patents listed in the Orange Book. Id. at 925. The subsequent-filer's ANDA included
Paragraph IV certifications to the LEPs and a Paragraph 1Il certification to the EEP. Id. at
926. The NDA holder only sued the subsequent-filer for infringement of two of the LEPs. Id.
at 925. The subsequent-filer counterclaimed for declaratory judgment of noninfringement
and invalidity for the three unasserted LEPs. Id. at 926.
116. Id. The NDA holder and first-filer entered into a settlement agreement to delay the
first-filer's market entry until 2011. Without a forfeiture provision or court judgment invali-
dating the LEPs, the first-filer could defer the approval of any other ANDAs. Id.
117. Id. This case highlights the court's focus on technicalities over equities. The tech-
nical issues of timing control whether jurisdiction is found. The question of whether a
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Following the Federal Circuit's decision in Eisai, the courts will proba-
bly focus less on the constitutional restraint of "controversy" and more on
whether the subsequent-filer can obtain approval and enter the market with a
favorable outcome in the declaratory judgment action, regardless of the ef-
fects on the first-filer's exclusivity period. It also seems likely that courts
will take a rather expansive view of what is "imminent" harm, since neither
covenants not to sue nor statutory disclaimers sufficed to dismiss declarato-
ry judgment actions. Both of these favor plaintiffs in declaratory judgment
actions and therefore would allow and encourage subsequent ANDA filers
to challenge more patents and seek to trigger generic exclusivity sooner.
Furthermore, although these cases formally concern the constitutional
right to immediate adjudication of rights, the courts can and probably will
limit this controversy analysis to the ANDA litigation arena. The question of
whether declaratory judgment actions allowed by Congress pose a case or
controversy was settled long ago. 18 MedImmune may simply have been the
Supreme Court's way of confirming Congress's constitutional authority to
create the cause of action for declaratory judgments by generic manufactur-
ers.
II: WHo SHOULD REGULATE THE ORANGE BOOK?
The Federal Circuit may be liberalizing the standing requirement for
declaratory judgment actions in response to the problems with the current
regulation system for generic entry. This section will argue that some other
forms of regulation are necessary due to the uninvolved and mechanical
approach that the FDA takes in regulating which patents are listed in the
Orange Book, which in turn controls the timing of generic approval and
entry. Possible forms of regulation include: (1) self-regulation by NDA
holders; (2) declaratory judgment actions to invalidate patents brought by
subsequent filers and issued by courts; (3) citizen petitions filed by various
competitors; (4) legislative amendments by Congress; and (5) antitrust in-
vestigations by the FTC.
A. Current FDA Regulation of the Orange Book
When a patent owner lists a patent in the Orange Book, the FDA pro-
vides regulatory enforcement of patent rights, even if its actions have the
effect of enforcing invalid patents or extending the scope of the patent to
subsequent-filer should be able to trigger a first-filer's exclusivity period (and, in essence,
expropriate that generic exclusivity) is a secondary consideration.
118. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) ("In providing rem-
edies and defining procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the constitutional sense
the Congress is acting within its delegated power over the jurisdiction of the federal courts
which the Congress is authorized to establish.").
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include noninfringing products.1 9 For example, without a Paragraph IV
certification to challenge the listed patents, the FDA will simply refuse to
approve any ANDAs until the listed patents for the RLD have expired.120
The FDA does not consider the patent's validity or whether it really covers
the approved drug.121 Moreover, once the generic manufacturer files the Par-
agraph IV certification, the NDA holder then has forty-five days to file an
infringement suit and trigger the automatic 30-month stay that prevents the
FDA from approving the ANDA.1 22 This automatic stay does not require the
NDA holder to meet the requirements for obtaining an injunction.123
The FDA only edits the Orange Book to remove ("delist") a patent in
response to an NDA holder's request, 24 even if the drug can no longer be
marketed.12 5 Even if an ANDA filer believes a patent is improperly listed, it
must include a certification to the patent.126 The FDA's regulations permit
119. See Purepac Pharm. Co. v. Thompson, 354 F. 3d 877 (D.C. Cir. 2004); infra note
139.
120. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B).
121. See Apotex, Inc. v. Thompson, 347 F.3d 1335, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2003) ("[Tlhe
[Hatch-Waxman] Act does not require [the FDA] to police the listing process by analyzing
whether the patents listed by NDA applicants actually claim the subject drugs or applicable
methods of using those drugs."); 59 Fed. Reg. 50, 343 (Oct. 3, 1994) ("FDA does not have
the expertise to review patent information. The agency believes that its resources would be
better utilized in reviewing applications rather than reviewing patent claims."); ORANGE
BOOK, supra note 8, at § 1.12 ("Applicant holders are requested to inform the FDA Orange
Book Staff (OBS) of any changes or corrections.").
122. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
123. See Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1378 n.6 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(quoting Terry G. Mahn, Patenting Drug Products: Anticipating Hatch-Waxman Issues Dur-
ing the Claims Drafting Process, 54 FOOD DRUG L.J. 245, 250 (1999)) ("[L]isting gives 'the
patentee/NDA holder almost automatic injunctive relief for even marginal infringement
claims.' "); see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (applying to
patent litigation these requirements: a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits, irrepa-
rable harm without an injunction, balance of hardships tipping in its favor, and
considerations of the public interest).
124. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2010) ("Unless the application holder withdraws or amends
its patent information in response to FDA's request, the agency will not change the patent
information in the list.").
125. See ORANGE BOOK, supra note 8, at Preface, Introduction ("Every product on the
List is subject at all times to regulatory action. From time to time, approved products may be
found in violation of one or more provisions of the Act. In such circumstances, the Agency
will commence appropriate enforcement action to correct the violation, if necessary, by se-
curing removal of the product from the market by voluntary recall, seizure, or other
enforcement actions. Such regulatory actions are, however independent of the inclusion of a
product on the List. The main criterion for inclusion of a product is that it has an application
with an effective approval that has not been withdrawn for safety or efficacy reasons. FDA
believes that retention of a violative product on the List will not have any significant adverse
health consequences, because other legal mechanisms are available to the Agency to prevent
the product's actual marketing. FDA may however, change a product's therapeutic equiva-
lence rating if the circumstances giving rise to the violation change or otherwise call into
question the data upon which the Agency's assessment of whether a product meets the crite-
ria for therapeutic equivalence was made.") (emphasis added).
126. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f).
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any person to write to the agency to dispute the listing of a patent by calling
into question "the accuracy or relevance of patent information submitted" or
claiming that "an applicant has failed to submit required patent infor-
mation." 27 However, the FDA will not change the listings unless the NDA
holder affirmatively requests the change.
B. The Role of NDA Holders
NDA holders are the least likely to efficiently and effectively regulate
the Orange Book under the current system. The FDA mechanically applies
the rules to preserve an NDA holder's market exclusivity, without any con-
sideration of the patent's validity or scope-a fact that NDA holders have
learned to exploit. In practice, NDA holders have commonly listed as many
patents as possible in order to cover as many variations of a drug as possi-
ble. 2 8 For example, in Teva v. Eisai,129 Eisai, the NDA holder, listed four
patents that it later decided not to enforce; Eisai statutorily disclaimed two
patents and offered a covenant not to sue on the two nondisclaimed pa-
tents. 30 However, all of these patents remained listed in the Orange Book
and continued to serve as an obstacle for generic drug entry. As Eisai shows,
such a scenario has been quite advantageous to NDA holders, since they do
not have to defend their decision to list the patents to the FDA.'
The Hatch-Waxman framework also relieves NDA holders of the bur-
den to monitor competitors who may be developing generic drugs that
potentially infringe on the listed patents. When a generic manufacturer files an
ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification, the generic manufacturer must noti-
fy the NDA holder and patent owner of the possible infringing product.'32
Without the need for a more proactive role, it seems that NDA holders stand
to benefit from keeping the status quo.
C. The Role of the Courts
If courts consistently choose to exercise jurisdiction over declaratory
judgment actions claiming injuries caused by Orange Book listings, NDA
holders could be forced to more effectively self-regulate. With an increase in
127. Id.
128. See FED. TRADE COMM'N, GENERic DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:
AN FTC STUDY 5, 70-71 (2002), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; see
also 148 CONG. REC. S7635-37 (daily ed. July 31, 2002) (listing examples of tangential
patents listed in the Orange Book and noting that "drug manufacturers go to extraordinary
lengths to insure that the FDA list any un-expired patent covering a profitable brand-name
drug").
129. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
130. Id. at 1345.
131. The requirement for listing patents is only whether the RLD falls within the scope
of the patent's claims. See Biovail Corp., Int'l v. Andrx Pharm., Inc., 239 F.3d 1297, 1301
(Fed. Cir. 2001). As a result, listed patents often cover more than just the RLD.
132. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B).
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declaratory judgment actions from subsequent-filers eager to trigger exclu-
sivity periods, NDA holders will more frequently participate in costly
litigation and their patents will be subject to more challenges. If they con-
tinue to lose declaratory judgment actions, NDA holders may start spending
time and effort pruning the Orange Book listings rather than merely await-
ing possible court judgments and injunctions.
In addition, while courts may not be able to directly order the FDA to del-
ist a patent,"' the D.C. Circuit has required the FDA to relist patents that an
NDA holder has requested to be delisted.'34 The court found that ordering the
removal of a Paragraph IV certification in an ANDA unlawfully deprived the
first-filer of its exclusivity period.'3" The FDA argued that its policy--delisting
a patent when an NDA holder has requested it and has not filed a lawsuit
against an ANDA holder who has filed a Paragraph IV certification to the
patent-allows the NDA holder to remove a barrier to ANDA approval if
the drug is not relevant. This policy also allows the FDA to retain its minis-
terial role rather than being forced into a role of interpreting patent
listings.136 Finding for the generics, the D.C. Circuit supported its ruling by
noting that the removal requirement took away the Act's intended incentive
for challenging the patent.'37 If this reasoning is followed, the courts could
have a limited role in ensuring that NDA holders do not strategically delist
patents to eliminate a first-filer's exclusivity period.
133. The FDA will only remove a patent listed in the Orange Book in response to an
NDA holder's request. 21 C.F.R. § 314.53(f) (2011). To get around this, a court can enter an
injunction ordering the NDA holder to request that the FDA delist a patent. See Abbott Labs.
v. Novopharm Ltd., 104 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (requiring the NDA holder to
submit a request to the FDA to remove an expired patent).
134. See Ranbaxy Labs. Ltd. v. Leavitt, 469 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 2006). NDA holders
have tried to strategically delist patents so that a first-filer forfeits its generic exclusivity
period. See, e.g., Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug
Admin. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to William A. Rakoczy, Rakoczy, Molino,
Mazzochi & Siwik, LLP, (May 7, 2008), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!
documenttDetail;D=FDA-2007-N-0445-0026 (finding that delisting a patent triggers the
seventy-five-day clock 'for "failure to market" forfeiture event under 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb) unless the delisting is as a result of a counterclaim by an ANDA
applicant); Letter from Gary Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug Admin.
Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to ANDA Applicant (Oct. 28, 2008), available at
http://
www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2008-N-0483-0017 (finding a first-filer
forfeited exclusivity for failing to maintain its Paragraph IV certification).
135. Ranbaxy, 469 F.3d at 126; see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(12)(viii)(B) (requiring
ANDA filers to amend the application if a patent is delisted). This court's decision seems to
be more in line with the view that the generic exclusivity period is a "right" not merely an
"incentive."
136. Ranbaxy, 469 F.3d at 123, 125.
137. Id. at 126; see Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Sebelius, 595 F.3d 1303, 1318 (D.C. Cir.
2010) (holding that MMA forfeiture provisions not meant to allow brand manufacturers to
"unilaterally vitiate a generic's exclusivity").
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D. The Role of ANDA Filers
The MMA amendments permit generic manufacturers to bring counter-
claims ordering the NDA holder to "correct or delete" patent information if
the patent claimed neither the approved drug nor an approved method of
use.' The Federal Circuit has construed this statutory language to constrain
the scope of relief to correcting or deleting an incorrect patent number or
expiration date, but not a use code."' Even if the listed use code is beyond
the scope of the patent claims, the Federal Circuit will deem a patent
properly listed in the Orange Book so long as it claims any one of the ap-
proved uses. The statute also expressly states that the provision does not
create an independent cause of action; a generic manufacturer can only seek
correction or deletion as a counterclaim in a patent infringement suit.140
However, one district court has held that the generic manufacturer can ask
for that relief in a declaratory judgment action as part of the district court's
inherent power of giving effect to its judgment.14 1 Even though Teva v. Eisai
138. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii)(2010). Before the 2003 MMA amendments, a generic
drug manufacturer did not have a cause of action to seek to delist a patent in the Orange
Book; it had to seek relief under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-06 (1999); Andrx v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1378-80
(Fed. Cir. 2002); Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1332-33 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(holding that declaratory judgment action by the generic manufacturer to challenge listing in
Orange Book was an improper private action as an attempt to enforce the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act and not a proper defense to infringement suit). A district court
could, however, order a patentee to request that the FDA delist its expired patent in order to
effectuate a judgment. See Abbott Labs., 104 F.3d at 1309 (requiring the NDA holder to
submit a request to the FDA to remove an expired patent).
139. See Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 601 F.3d 1359, 1364-66
(Fed. Cir. 2010). FDA regulations require NDA holders to submit a "use code narrative" that
describes a method of using the drug. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.53 (2010); FDA FORM 3542A,
supra note 10; FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PATENT INFORMATION SUBMITTED WITH TIE FILING
OF AN NDA, AMENDMENT, OR SUPPLEMENT, FORM 3542 (2010), available at http:fwww.
fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Forms/UCM048345.pdf. The FDA as-
signs a "use code" based on this narrative and uses the description provided to determine
whether a generic manufacturer is seeking approval for a patented use of the drug. See 21
U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(viii). However, without a way to correct a use code, generic manufac-
turers cannot force the FDA to recognize when it enforces a patent beyond its proper scope.
140. There was significant concern that creating a private cause of action might result
in generics abusing this and harassing brands. See 148 CONG. REC. S7,644 (daily ed. July 31,
2002); 148 CONG. REC. S7345 (daily ed. July 25, 2002); Letter Carl B. Feldbaum, President,
Biotechnology Indus. Ass'n, to Senator Edward Kennedy (July 15, 2002), available at
http://www.bio.org/advocacy/letters/letter-sen-ted-kennedy. This was addressed by the lan-
guage that generics would not obtain civil and monetary penalties, only delisting of patents.
See 148 CONG. REC. S7641 (daily ed. July 31, 2002) (including a letter from the President
and CEO of General Motors).
141. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(ii)(Il); Apotex, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-2768, 2010
WL 678104, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 23, 2010) (citing Mylan Pharm., 268 F.3d at 1333). But see
148 CONG. REC. S7645 (daily ed. July 31, 2002) (proposing that the cause of action be lim-
ited to counterclaims, not "as an original and separate action," in order to curb litigation that
would not necessarily advance the goal of "making generics available to consumers more
quickly"). The purpose of adding this cause of action was stated as to "help to reduce both
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may lead to more declaratory judgments and thus increase the availability of
this remedy, the limited changes that a generic manufacturer could effect
make it impractical to leave regulation of the Orange Book to the ANDA
filers. 142
E. The Use of Citizen Petitions
Generic manufacturers have also used citizen petitions 43 as an attempt
to circumvent delays to generic drug entry. Brand name manufacturers and
first-filers may also use citizen petitions as a tool to delay generic entry.
Brand name manufacturers have filed citizen petitions requesting, among
other things, additional bioequivalence or safety studies from generic manu-
facturers, additional patent certifications to post-NDA patents, and
classification of the NDA as a different dosage form.'" Examples of these
petitions in the Aricept controversy include the citizen petition filed by
Ranbaxy to challenge Teva's shared exclusivity periodl 4 5 and the Apotex
and Eisai citizen petitions to revoke final approval of Teva's ANDA.'"6 This
was previously an easy delay tactic because the FDA was not allowed to
review' an ANDA until the petition was resolved. However, Congress passed
the FDA Amendments Act ("FDAA") in 2007,147 which requires the FDA to
continue the ANDA approval process during the petition review period and to
the cost of prescription drugs and the cost of prescription drug litigation," which may very
well be derailed by declaratory judgment actions increasing the amount and costs of litiga-
tion. See 148 CONG. REc. S7648 (daily ed. July 31, 2002).
142. On a side note, one generic manufacturer attempted to effectuate regulation of
listings through false marking litigation, arguing that Eisai is "advertising" its disclaimed
patents in the Orange Book by including them in the Aricept listing. See Complaint, Pharm.
Techs., LLC v. Eisai, Inc., No. I 1-cv-00665 (D. Ariz. Apr. 5, 2011).
143. A citizen petition is a request that an administrative agency take or refrain from
some administrative action, including issuing, amending, or revoking a regulation or order.
21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2011). The FDA's response to a citizen petition is considered the agen-
cy's official position. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.45(d) (2011).
144. See GENERIC DRUG ENTRY, supra note 128.
145. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., Food & Drug Admin., Ctr. for Drug Evalu-
ation & Research, to Shashank Upadhye, Vice President, Global Intellectual Prop., and
David M. Fox, Hogan Lovells US LLP (Nov. 26, 2010), available at http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2010-P-0430-0015 (showing that Ranbaxy was
the first-filer).
146. See Letter from David M. Fox to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin.
(Aug. 12, 2010), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2010-
P-0430-0001; Letter from Janet Woodcock, Director, Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research,
to Shashank Upadhye, Vice President, Global Intellectual Prop., and David M. Fox, supra
note 145; Letter from Shashank Upadhye, Vice President, Global Head of Intellectual Prop.,
Apotex Inc., to Dockets Mgmt. Branch, Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug Admin. (July
14, 2009), available at http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2009-P-0326-
0001 (showing that Apotex was a subsequent-filer and Eisai was the NDA holder).
147. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121
Stat. 823 (2007).
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take final action on the petition within six months.148 Congress also directed
the FDA to deny citizen petitions if they were "submitted with the primary
purpose of delaying the approval of an applicant" and do not facially raise
"valid scientific or regulatory issues."l49 Nonetheless, citizen petitions are still
used to challenge exclusivity periods 5 o and to potentially extend exclusivity'
based on patents in the Orange Book.
F. The Role of Congress
Further congressional modifications to the Hatch-Waxman Act concern-
ing Orange Book listings seem unlikely in the near future. Even if Congress
does address the issue and put a different statutory framework in place, the
FDA may lack the resources or capacity to better monitor and update the
Orange Book.'15 Instead, the recent discussions in Congress relating to drug
regulation have debated the anticompetitive effects of NDA holders settling
with first-filers to delay triggering their exclusivity periods and the FTC's
possible role in the regulation of those agreements."' There has also been
148. See id. § 914 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(F) (2010)).
149. 21 U.S.C. § 355(q)(1)(E)(2010).
150. See Letter from William A. Rakoczy and Lara E. FitzSimmons, Counsel for Lupin
Ltd., to Division of Dockets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 18, 2010), available at
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=FDA-2010-P-0549-0001 (asking that the
first-filer's exclusivity be revoked and awarded to the subsequent-filer because the
first-filer's ANDA was not "substantially complete" when filed or "lawfully maintain[ed]"
because it had a Paragraph IV certification to the EEP and a Paragraph III certification to an
LEP).
151. See Letter from Robert F. Green, Counsel to Lupin Atlantis Holdings, S.A., to Div.
of Documents Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin. (Oct. 22, 2010), available at http://www.
regulations.govt#!documentDetail;D=FDA-20 10-P-056 1-0001 (asking that accepted ANDAs
claiming dosage forms different from the RLD be rescinded and required to submit new
certifications, thus requiring new notice letter and restarting the 30-month stay).
152. See 148 CONG. REc. 6024 (2002) (attempting to amend 21 U.S.C. § 321 to require
the FDA to "publish . .. only information that is qualified patent information" and "consult
with" the USPTO); 147 CONG. REC. 3918-21 (2001) (discussing the proposed Brown-
Emerson Amendment to direct FDA's funding toward regulation of Orange Book listings,
with opposition noting that the FDA does not have the statutory authority to evaluate the
validity of patents).
153. See Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl l2:s.00027:. In previous sessions of
Congress, the former was raised under the same title as: S. 369, 11Ith Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S.
316, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); S. 3582, 109th Cong. (2d Sess. 2006); and H.R. 1432, 1 10th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). A similar bill was previously raised as Protecting Consumer Access to
Generic Drugs Act of 2009, H.R. 1706, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) and H.R. 1902, 110th
Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). Congressmen in favor of the bill attempted to include it in the Supple-
mental Appropriations Act (War Funding Bill), H.R. 4899, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), but the
Senate dropped the provision. 156 CONG. REC. 5379, 5358, 5404-05 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 2010);
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkgBILLS- 11 hr4899enr/pdf/BILLS- Ill hr4899enr.pdf. They also
attempted and failed to pass it in the Fiscal Year 2011 Financial Services and General Gov-
ernment Appropriations Bill, also known as S. 3677, 11Ith Cong. (2d Sess. 2010), available
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?dl 1l:s.03677:. Several Congress members ex-
pressed their concerns that these changes would give the FTC too much power and would go
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some debate about whether authorized generics should be banned during the
generic exclusivity period, but Congress has not acted to close that loophole
in the patent laws.154 In short, Congress has apparently decided to leave the
current regulatory system in place as is.
G. The Role of the FTC
The FTC has attempted to regulate the Orange Book with little success so
far. Because listings allow NDA holders to trigger 30-month stays or otherwise
delay the entry of generics into the market, the FTC believes that improper list-
ings extend the legal monopoly of a patent beyond its intended term. In support
of its view, the FTC has filed amicus briefs' 5 and lawsuits,' 6 testified before
Congress,5 7 commented on the FDA's procedures,' investigated listings and
issued complaints'" and consent orders,160 released reports,'161 and submitted
citizen petitions.162 Despite this effort, several courts have already disagreed
against the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act by discouraging generic manufacturers from
challenging patents. 156 CONG. REC. H5386 (daily ed. Jul. 1, 2010). The bill has been
revived, but unless those concerns are addressed it most likely will not get passed. See Pre-
serve Access to Affordable Generics Act, S. 27, 112th Cong. (2011).
154. See Fair Prescription Drug Competition Act, S. 373, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011);
H.R. 741, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); H.R. 573, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); S. 438,
1 10th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); H.R. 806, 1 10th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); see also supra note
24.
155. See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae, Am. Bioscience, Inc.
v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. (C.D. Cal. Sept. 7, 2000) (No. CV-00-08577), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/09/amicusbrief.pdf; Memorandum of Law of Amicus Curiae, In
re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 1410), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/ogcbriefs/buspirone.pdf.
156. See Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Cephalon, 551 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2008); In re
Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
157. See, e.g., Examining Issues Related to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Market-
place: A Review of the FTC Report, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Health of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 107th Cong.
(2002) (statement of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/10/generictestimony021009.pdf.
158. See Applications for FDA Approval to Market a New Drug, Food & Drug Admin.
Docket No. 02N-0417 (Dec. 23, 2002) (comments of the Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v030002.pdf; 180-Day Generic Drug Exclusivity for Abbreviated New
Drug Applications, Food & Drug Admin. Docket No. 85N-0214 (Nov. 4, 1999) (comments
of the Bureau of Competition & of Policy Planning of the Fed. Trade Comm'n), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990016.shtm.
159. See, e.g., Complaint, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 135 F.T.C. 444 (2003) (No. C-
4076), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf.
160. See, e.g., Biovail Corp., 134 F.T.C. 407 (2002) (consent order), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/04/biovaildecision.htm.
161. See Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, FEDER-
AL TRADE COMMISSION (Jan. 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/01/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf.
162. See Competition in the Technology Marketplace: Amicus Briefs and Other Advo-
cacy, FED. TRADE COMM'N (Aug. 19, 2010), http://www.ftc.gov/bc/tech/property/
advocacy.htm (noting that in May 2001 the FTC submitted a citizen petition to the FDA
seeking guidance on Orange Book patent listings).
296 [Vol. 18:269
with the FTC, finding that settlements between brand name manufacturers
and generic manufacturers, along with settlements between competing ge-
neric manufacturers, would not be per se illegal so long as they do not
attempt to go beyond the exclusionary restrictions provided to patent hold-
ers.163 Furthermore, although the MMA amendments require filing these
settlement agreements with the Assistant Attorney General and the FTC, the
Savings Clause notes that "any filing under this subtitle [shall not] constitute
or create a presumption of any violation of any competition laws."'" The
Supreme Court declined to weigh in on this issue, denying certiorari in a
recent case from the Second Circuit that asked whether such a settlement
agreement is per se lawful under the Sherman Act.165
H. So Who Should Regulate?
Unfortunately, the status quo reveals no single, effective source of regu-
lation. Without changes from Congress, it would appear that NDA holders
continue to hold significant power in controlling the patent listings in the
Orange Book under the Hatch-Waxman Act today. However, the liberaliza-
tion of declaratory judgment standing provides the courts, in conjunction
with subsequent-filers, a much more practical role in influencing that regu-
lation. Declaratory judgment actions may focus on collusion between brand
name manufacturers and first-filers, yet they may also effect better control
of the listings that time the entry of generic drugs. So long as the courts
keep in mind the goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act in deciding whether to
exercise jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment actions brought by sub-
sequent-filers, this combination of ANDA filers and judicial discretion may
help tie up some of the loose ends left by Congress.
III. EISAi's POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON ANDA LITIGATION
In the recent Federal Circuit opinions in Caraco, Janssen, and Eisai, the
court noted that the cases before it would be analyzed differently under the
new MMA forfeiture provisions.166 Perhaps the court viewed the amendments
as a cue that Congress expected the legislative expansion of declaratory judg-
ment jurisdiction to address the issue of delays from generic exclusivity. The
163. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir.
2008); In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-
Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056 (1 tth Cir. 2005). But see In re
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 908-09 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
similarly structured noncompete agreement is "per se illegal").
164. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act (MMA) of
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112(a)(1), t17.
165. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010),
cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1606 (2011).
166. The first Paragraph IV certifications in those cases were filed before December
2003, so the MMA amendments did not apply. See supra Background.
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Federal Circuit's decision in Eisai establishes a subsequent-filer's ability to
survive a motion to dismiss based on Article Ill requirements in a declaratory
judgment action.'16 As a result, the number of suits brought by subsequent-
filers is quite likely to increase, providing the courts with a more practical role
in influencing NDA-holders' self-regulation of the Orange Book. If NDA
holders observe subsequent-filers prevailing in these actions, they may be-
come more reluctant to list questionable patents. The effect of the increase in
litigation on the marketplace and its players, however, is unclear, and courts
will have to make a number of policy decisions when choosing to exercise
jurisdiction over these cases. These Federal Circuit cases formally con-
cerned whether a case or controversy existed, but the court was also
conscious of the equities of allowing declaratory judgment actions to
proceed, when those actions could generate final court judgments that take
away the statutorily-provided generic exclusivity period from the first-filers.s68
Courts should still consider the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act: to encour-
age generic manufacturers to be aggressive in challenging patents for the
public good while recognizing the need to protect and reward innovation in
the pharmaceutical field.169
The liberalization of standing for generic manufacturers may have a num-
ber of positive consequences. By allowing generic manufacturers to challenge
patents, the courts provide shorter timelines for ascertaining the legal rights of
the parties.170 The increased certainty that results from a declaratory judgment
of invalidity or noninfringement will encourage generic companies to expend
resources in order to enter the market sooner.'7' Another benefit of liberalizing
standing is a reduction in the number of "scarecrow" patents listed in the
Orange Book to delay generic entry.'72 Allowing more declaratory judgment
167. See Courtenay Brinckerhoff, The Federal Circuit Solidifies the Future for Subsequent
ANDA Litigation, PHARMAPATENTS (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/
federal-circuit-decisions/the-federal-circuit-solidifies-the-future-for-subsequent-anda-litigation.
168. The Federal Circuit in Eisai found that the district court had erred in dismissing
the case because it based its decision on its apparently incorrect belief that it lacked subject
matter jurisdiction, but the Federal Circuit's decision still left the exercise of jurisdiction
over these declaratory judgments to the discretion of the district courts. Teva Pharm. USA,
Inc. v. Eisai Co., 620 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
169. See, e.g., Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1294 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (citing Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
170. See 149 CONG. REc. S15,885 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003) ("The declaratory judg-
ment provisions in [the MMA] are intended to encourage such early resolution of patent
disputes.").
171. Cf Apotex Inc. v. Forest Labs., Inc., Case No. 2:11-cv-10129-AJT-MKM (E.D.
Mich. Jan. 10, 2011) (filed) (subsequent-filer seeking to trigger exclusivity because its "right
to market a non-infringing generic product without the risk of catastrophic infringement
damages" is "impaired" by "legal uncertainty"); Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d
921, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (citing 149 CONG. REC. S15,885 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 2003)).
172. See Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1336 n.2
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, 846 F.2d 731, 735
(Fed. Cir. 1988)). The phrase analogizes patents to scarecrows that NDA holders have listed
in the Orange Book to "scare off' generic competitors who do not wish to be subjected to
actions by generic manufacturers may also speed up time-to-market for af-
fordable generics, resulting in more savings both to consumers and the
government.
The MMA amendments included a provision that generic exclusivity
would not "roll over," which Congress obviously intended to speed up the
entry of generics into the market.I73 This statutory clarification may push other
generic manufacturers to more actively regulate the patents listed in the
Orange Book through litigation. Soon after the Eisai decision, a generic man-
ufacturer filed a complaint to obtain a declaratory judgment against a
disclaimed patent to create a forfeiture event.17 4 If a subsequent-filer challeng-
es patents in order to eliminate a first-filer's exclusivity period"'7  and
convinces the court to order the NDA holder to delist its patent,'7 1 this creates
an interesting dynamic: since all of the first-filer's competitors stand to benefit
from a declaratory judgment that results in forfeiture of the exclusivity period,
subsequent-filers might possibly join forces for this kind of litigation.
On the other hand, setting precedent that is very likely to lead to an in-
crease in litigation has its downsides. The federal courts currently have heavy
caseloads, and adding more declaratory judgment actions would only further
overload the courts. Additionally, there is often concurrent litigation on other
patents between the same parties,'77 which may already be determinative of
whether the ANDA filer can enter the market any earlier.17 1
potential patent infringement litigation even if a court would eventually find the patents
invalid or unenforceable.
173. A "second-to-file" ANDA does not inherit exclusivity if a first-filer forfeits it, so the
market would be open to all generics sooner. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(VI)(iii)(ll) (2010).
174. See Complaint, Par Pharm., Inc. v. UCB, Inc., No. I 1-cv-02010-MSG (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 23, 2011); Complaint, Impax Labs., Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., No. 10-cv-06554(DMC-JAD)
(D.N.J. Dec. 16, 2010); Complaint, Sandoz Inc. v. Boehringer Ingelheim Int'l GmbH, 3:10-
cv-00437-UATC-MCR (M.D. Fla. May 19, 2010). A "forfeiture event" is an event that trig-
gers the forfeiture of the generic exclusivity period. By creating the forfeiture event, other
generic manufacturers can obtain FDA approval, and the disclaimed patent that is still listed
in the Orange Book is no longer a block to generic entry.
175. See Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F.Supp.2d 921, 926 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Dey, L.P.
v. Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355, 361-62 (D. Del. 2009).
176. The MMA amendments created a counterclaim cause of action to delist patents
from the Orange Book. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(ii).
177. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008);
Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008); and Teva
Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Eisai Co., Ltd., 620 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2010), exemplify this very
likely possibility-the parties were already involved in infringement suits for the EEPs when
the subsequent-filers attempted to initiate declaratory judgment actions for the LEPs.
178. For example, if an EEP is found to be valid, infringed, and enforceable, then the
declaratory judgment action on unasserted LEPs is rendered moot. In his dissent in Caraco,
Senior Judge Friedman argued that declaratory judgments are "[iun most instances [sought]
to protect [the alleged infringer] from a subsequent judicial determination that has a signifi-
cant adverse financial impact upon the infringer." Caraco, 527 F.3d at 1298 (Friedman, J.,
dissenting). However, in that case, Caraco was seeking a declaratory judgment to trigger
the first-filer's exclusivity period so that its own entry into the market could be hastened.
Judge Friedman found that Caraco's argument was "highly speculative and conjectural,"
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Furthermore, permitting subsequent-filers to trigger first-filers' exclusivity
periods before they can start marketing would seem to cheapen the incentive
to file first.' 79 Subsequent-filers are obviously motivated to eliminate the first-
filer's generic exclusivity so they can enter the market sooner. While courts
can encourage first-filers to be more aggressive in challenging patents, entirely
depriving first-filers of the generic exclusivity period may contravene the goals
of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Liberalizing declaratory judgments may also be an attempt to push
ANDA filers toward filing more Paragraph IV certifications. 80 This may
speed up generic entry by weeding out scarecrow patents sooner, but it
would do so at the very steep cost of discouraging investments by innova-
tors in pioneer drug research and development.' 8' NDA holders will also be
much more determined to hold onto and litigate any exclusivity they can
with the "patent cliff' rapidly approaching.' 82 If the courts could keep the
purpose of the generic exclusivity period in mind when deciding these
"involve[d] uncertain legal issues that have not yet been resolved," and "assume[d] that
[Caraco] [would] prevail in its non-infringement claim-an uncertain assumption at best."
Id. at 1298.
179. On the other hand, the generic exclusivity period may not have been the best in-
centive to encourage faster generic drug entry. In Eisai, 620 F.3d 1353, Teva spent the
resources to litigate and challenge the patents even with no chance of obtaining the exclusiv-
ity via the Gate ANDA. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
180. If first-filers fail to "clear the brush" for other generics to enter the market, allow-
ing subsequent-filers to expropriate the generic exclusivity period could spur first-filers to be
more aggressive in challenging patents. However, pushing more Paragraph IV certifications
may result in more frivolous arguments being made when challenging patents. See Yama-
nouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347-48 (Fed. Cir. 2000);
Glaxo Grp. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Eli Lilly & Co.
v. Zenith Goldline Pharm., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 753, 759 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
181. See 153 CONG. REC. S1352 (daily ed. Jan. 30, 2007) (statement of Sen. Leahy)
(noting that the declaratory judgments were intended to be an additional incentive for gener-
ic manufacturers to challenge patents); 149 CONG. REc. S8190 (daily ed. Jun. 19, 2003)
(statement of Sen. McCain) (recognizing that bolstering generic entry may be seen as imped-
ing the "tremendous investments" of the drug industry); Id. at S8193 (statement of Sen. Judd
Gregg) (elaborating on the need to support the drug industry's "innovation side" as balanced
with public's need for accessible generic drugs).
182. The "patent cliff" is the short, upcoming timeframe in which key patents covering
top-selling brand name drugs will expire, so sales will plummet as generic drug competitors
take over the market. See Ben Hirschler, Drugmakers Face $140 bln Patent "Cliff", REU-
TERS (May 1, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLOl 12153120070502; Sara
Houlton, Pharma Refocuses on the Patent Cliff, CHEMISTRY WORLD (Jan. 2009), http://www.
rsc.org/chemistryworld/Issues/2009/January/PharmaRefocusesOnThePatentCliff.asp. But see
Stewart Lyman, The Myth of the "Patent Cliff', XCONOMY (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.
xconomy.com/national/2010/11/29/the-myth-of-the-patent-cliff.
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actions,"' they could align their analyses of justiciability with the goals of
the Hatch-Waxman Act.184
Furthermore, while Congress intended to create an incentive for generic
manufacturers to challenge listed patents with the 180-day exclusivity peri-
od-either by questioning a patent's validity or by designing around a narrow
one-generic manufacturers have viewed the exclusivity period as a right, not
a reward.'" As a result, generic manufacturers have designed settlements,
commonly known as "reverse payment" or "pay-for-delay" agreements, where
they trade their "right" to enter the market under their ANDA for large sums
of money from the brand name manufacturer. The brand manufacturers ob-
viously benefit from the extra time as the sole provider of the drug. The
FTC keenly opposes this entitled attitude, especially in light of what it con-
siders to be anticompetitive behavior;186 when first-filers use their "right" to
delay their own entry and create a bottleneck that delays the entry of other
generics, this improperly extends the statutory exclusivity.'" Some recent
district court opinions 8 appear to support the FTC's interpretation by al-
lowing declaratory judgments by subsequent-filers that may very well
eliminate the "right" of a first-filer, especially when it appears to the court
183. It may make sense for first-filers to intervene in these declaratory judgment ac-
tions if courts view generic exclusivity as a "right." Then first-filers have a legal interest in
the decisions.
184. One commonly understood goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act, particularly from the
MMA provision explicitly authorizing declaratory judgments, is providing legal certainty but
not prematurely advising parties. See supra notes 170-171. Another such goal is maintaining
the careful balance between protecting innovator drug research and development and facili-
tating generic drug approval. See supra note 169.
185. According to the FTC, generic manufacturers see the exclusivity as a "right" that
"cannot be divested even when that eligibility is based on an erroneously listed patent"; the
FTC noted that exclusivity is not guaranteed, so it is merely an "incentive." See Letter from
Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., Food &
Drug Admin. (April 5, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/04/0504071
trivaxpharm.pdf. The FDA avoided the semantics and stated, "Exclusivity has been recog-
nized as an incentive and reward for challenging a patent, but . .. it is not an entitlement that
vests with the submission of a paragraph IV certification." Letter from Stephen K. Galson,
Dir., Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, to Monte R. Browder, In-
tellectual Prop. Counsel, Ivax Pharm., Inc., to Kate C. Beardsley and Carmen M. Shepard
(Oct. 24, 2005).
186. See Letter from Donald S. Clark, Secretary, Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Div. of Dock-
ets Mgmt., Food & Drug Admin., supra note 185 (stating that the generic manufacturer had a
"flawed view" of the exclusivity as "a right awarded to a [first-filer], rather than an incentive
to challenge weak patents and design products that avoid infringing narrow ones."); see also
supra notes 135, 155-162 and accompanying text.
187. Even with the MMA forfeiture provisions, first-filers can still delay subsequent-
filers' ANDAs by waiting seventy-five days before entering the market. See 21 U.S.C.
§355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2010).
188. See Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Dey, L.P. v.
Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355 (D. Del. 2009).
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that the first-filer is using its generic exclusivity in a manner inconsistent
with the purpose of the "incentive."l89
If courts tend toward finding for declaratory judgment plaintiffs, the en-
try of generic drugs in the market may speed up and therefore more rapidly
reduce the cost of drugs to the public. On the other hand, if the courts favor
NDA-holding defendants, these declaratory judgment proceedings may for-
tify the patents against further attack. The courts need to keep the goals of
the Hatch-Waxman Act in mind in deciding which way to tilt the balance: in
favor of protecting drug innovation or in favor of speeding up generic drug
accessibility.
CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit's decision in Teva v. Eisai will likely have conse-
quences beyond simply establishing that subsequent-filers have standing to
file declaratory judgment actions to trigger a first-filer's exclusivity period.
Increased litigation involving subsequent-filers and analyzing generic exclu-
sivity based on the Orange Book listings will probably cause a shift in
power to courts. This could have an overall positive effect so long as the
courts, when deciding whether to allow an action to proceed, remember the
Hatch-Waxman Act's goal of balancing the incentives for both brand name
manufacturers and generic manufacturers. There may be other opportunities
for courts if parties raise issues that are more amenable to considering that
balance. Escalated litigation may also encourage NDA holders to more ef-
fectively monitor which patents are listed or stay listed in the Orange Book,
which could speed up generic drug entry in a legitimate way. In the near
future, the courts will likely be the main force to effect change in the regula-
tion of generic drug entry and deal with the new dynamics among brand
name manufacturers, first-filers, and subsequent-filers. So long as the courts
maintain their focus on the balancing goals of the Hatch-Waxman Act, their
regulation may best serve all of the interests involved.
189. Using the "right" to delay entry for monetary gain in these pay-for-delay settle-
ments could be seen as antithetical to the purpose of the "incentive" of speeding up generic
entry. See Pfizer Inc. v. Apotex Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. Ill. 2010); Dey, L.P. v.
Sepracor, Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 355, 357 (D. Del. 2009).
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